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Resumen
El incremento de la demanda de comunicaciones inalámbricas frente a un estático es-
pectro radioeléctrico con el que hacerle frente ha terminado con éste casi asignado por
completo, que no ocupado: la solución pasa por utilizarlo de forma más eficiente y uno de
los mecanismos planteados es el comercio automático de espectro: hacer posible que los
operadores con licencia alquilen porciones a otros para satisfacer demandas de usuarios
en tiempo real en un mercado secundario, que permitiría un uso mayor y más dinámico
del espectro al tiempo que mantiene los incentivos de los operadores que ya poseen licen-
cia. La casuística de este área se debe al hecho de ser una problemática reciente, así como
lo es la herramienta más hábitual para su resolución, Teoría de Juegos; y al número de
modelos económicos de comercio pre-existentes con que se puede estudiar, que además
no pueden aplicarse directamente por las peculiaridades del bien con que se comercia así
como de los agentes. Este trabajo busca exponer una visión general, ordenada y didáctica
de las líneas de investigación existentes en este concepto. Se muestra como los distintos
trabajos desglosan el comercio de espectro en diferentes subbproblemas y sus combina-
ciones, con aplicaciones reales todavía lejanas y cómo la Teoría de Juegos es la solución
que se adapta de forma más natural al sentido del mismo.
Abstract
The increasing demand of wireless communications versus an static radio-electric spec-
trum to cope with it has led to an almost fully assigned but sparsely used spectrum. This
work studies one of the mechanisms proposed to improve spectrum efficiency, automated
spectrum trading: licensed operators would be able to lease unused bandwidth to unli-
censed ones so as to satisfy real time demands from users in secondary markets, resulting
in a higher and more dynamic usage of spectrum while having the advantage over any
other resource allocation method that there is an incentive to those who got a license. The
different case studies in the area exist due to the fact that it is a recent field of study and so
it is the main tool used here: Game Theory; along with the number of economic models
to study it, which can’t be directly applied because of the particular characteristics of the
trading good and agents. We are looking to give a general, organized and didactic view
of the diverse research lines on the area, showing how different works break spectrum
trading up into what sub-problems and their combinations, still far from real applications,
and how Game Theory is the most common and natural approach to deal with them.
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Wireless communications need of, among other resources, the radioelectric spectrum,
which is finite (at least what can be used to transmit information because electromagnetic
spectrum, that is to say, all possible radiations, is formally infinite). Government agencies
such as the ECC in Europe, Ofcom in the UK and FCC in the United States, grant access to
it through fixed, long term licenses on large geographical areas, traditionally on national
lotteries, comparative hearings and later on auctions in what is called “command-and-
control” management scheme. The ever-growing demand of spectrum due to the growth
and popularization of mobile services has left these traditional policies obsolete as almost
all the spectrum has already been assigned. However, reports like the 2002 one of the FCC
Spectrum Policy Task Force [1] pointed out that most of the licensed spectrum showed
very little use and it would be necessary to switch to a more flexible, market-oriented
management [4] to improve efficiency. So, in 2003, the FCC started allowing license
holders to lease their licenses under different constraints [11].
A dramatic improvement on spectrum usage efficiency could be possible thanks to
the development of “cognitive radios”, term that appears for the first time by J. Mitola in
[2], radios that are capable of gathering information about their surrounding radio envi-
ronment (cognitive capability) and adapt their transmission parameters according to what
they discovered (reconfigurability) [3]. In the most typical scenario, unlicensed users
(also called “secondary users”) with this equipment would look for unused fragments of
spectrum anywhere in time, space, frequency and/or power, known as “spectrum holes”,
and use them for their transmissions under some harm constraints for the protection of
licensed users (“primary users”).
This situation corresponds to the “Hierarchical Access Model”, one of the possible
models under “Dynamic Spectrum Access” (DSA) [5], but there are more [6] as the “Ex-
clusive Use Model” , which considers leasing or selling licenses, the “Spectrum Commons
Model’ which considers open sharing with no categories of users. In fact, there is still a
long debate on how the spectrum should be considered, either as a property (“property
rights”) related to the exclusive use and hierarchical model or as a common good like a
town river, see [7]for more on this. There is more on regulation issues on [11]
No matter which of these models is considered, an improvement on spectrum usage
to deal with demands and new services can annoy already licensed operators, as these
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approaches mean some costs to them such as changes in their infrastructures, lowered
QoS because of interferences, profit reduction due to increased competition... , apart from
the fact that they already paid for their licenses. Among all mechanisms proposed to
improve spectrum efficiency, automated spectrum trading has the advantage of providing
economic (and/or any other) incentives to these already established operators, encourag-
ing their cooperation and avoiding demotivation on their investments or future primary
operators, being this the main issue addressed by most works on this area. At the same
time, “pricing” is a tool to efficient resource allocation and prevents infra-utilization and
may contribute to a auto-regulated system (if spectrum markets are created and full com-
petition is achieved). Apart from this social/economic problems, cognitive networks also
present a vast range of techonological challenges [9]
Previous works in Economy are not easily translated to spectrum trading because of
big differences not only with the agents that take part on these transactions but also with
peculiarities of the trading good. Regarding the agents, they are automatic agents (how-
ever, automatic transactions on Stock Exchange are starting to be used [49]); their supply
and demand can vary in real time because their need to transmit depends on informa-
tion generation, which may change fast; the fact that these agents may not have com-
plete and/or reliable information about the market due to the complexity that it would
involve, specially in ad-hoc networks (it would imply, for example, that all entities know
all channel gains, among much more information). About the trading good, spectrum
characteristics can also vary and the perception of them made by the agents, with regard
to availability, quality (physical variatiopns on channel parameters). In addition, the same
spectrum portion can be valued differently by different buyers, depending on the usage
they make of it. There are more aspects to take into account, such that it is divisible, it can
be shared simultaneously by users where their activity could harm each other , it can be
reutilized geographically... All this adds to the previously announced technological and
social/economic challenges.
Our main contribution is to serve as an introduction to the immense number of case
stuides available in spectrum trading, trying to categorize the different sub-problems they
tackle and techniques used, with a special attention on the most recent works and with a
essentially didactic view which is directly translated into the structure of our work, dealing
with these works in an increasing complexity order. In section 2 we breakdown the works
with one buyer and one seller of spectrum. In section 3 we show monopolies. The most
typical situations with competition among sellers and buyers are studied in section 4.
We devote a special section to a very popular spectrum trading mechanism in section 5,
auctions. We give some hints of future research lines and conclusions on section 6.
Finally, as an Appendix, we develop an spectrum trading model based on a single-
sided auction using a Markov Decision Process where several secondary users try to ac-
cess a system offering a price (from a finite set) and the operator decides to let them in
or out depending on the tradeoff among blocking probability of primary users and profit
from than accesing user.
Chapter 2
“When it takes two to tango”
The foundation of the spectrum trading house (and any trading in general) is the case
where a transaction takes place between only two entities. Usually one of these entities,
the ”seller", wants to supply unused spectrum opportunities it owns for as much monetary
value as possible, whereas the ”buyer" is interested in that good but willing to pay as less
as it can. ∗ Although this situation can appear as simplistic, it is useful as more than
as a starting point of understanding, it can resemble a real scenario when primary and
secondary networks have a centralized structure so the transaction is negotiated between








Figure 2.1: Basic spectrum trading
For the buyer, the compromise between its interest in what the seller offers and its
cost is expressed in the utility function, which is a quantitative measure of the buyer’s
∗There are variations on this: the buyer may not pay with money but with cooperation with the seller’s
transmissions; the buyer may not be willing to pay less but to get the best possible quality; the transaction
good could be bandwidth, data rate, successfully sent packets...
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satisfaction degree. Derived from that function, the demand function can be obtained,
which expresses how much of the trading good should be bought given a price in order
to maximize its satisfaction. Similarly, the seller is also in a compromise between the
revenue it obtains from the buyer and some costs associated with the sale: as it will have
less remaining spectrum available, it may not be able to satisfy an increase of demand
from primary users (higher blocking probability), interferences, apart from fixed costs
because of the investment in infrastructure. This compromise is expressed in the profit
function, and differentiating it with respect to the amount of good sold, the supply function
is obtained, which shows how much of the trading good should be sold given a price in
order to maximize its satisfaction.
One solution to this conflict of interests between the buyer and the seller is proposed
by D.Niyato and E.Hossain in some of their works [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], and its based
on the supply/demand model of Microeconomics theory (with some techniques being
used to eliminate the constraint of perfect competition of the market), whose solution
is the market-equilibrium price, a price that makes supply and demand equal and thus,
maximizes satisfaction for both the seller and the buyer so that there is no incentive for any
of them to deviate from it. Solving that equation in a centralized way may imply having
an almost global knowledge of the network (i.e. the demand function could depend on the
channels gains) which is a hard constraint to met in a real environment, so they proposed
several distributed and iterative algorithms to reach the solution.
Chapter 3
Monopolies
Some works such as [23, 24, 20, 19, 22, 21, 25, 26, 30, 27, 31, 29, 28, 32] feature only one
entity as seller while introducing several secondary users. Users take their own decisions
independently, although they influence each other (i.e primary operators charge them as
a function of their total demands). As we said in the introduction, the most studied issue
is “pricing” to incentive licensed operators [23, 24, 22], while another important focus
of this section is resource allocation [20, 19]. A model with several sellers and several
buyers would be more natural and desirable due to the increased competition that would
maximize the effects of spectrum trading. These works, however, use a monopoly model
because of their interest to simplify the framework, getting rid of buyers competition, so
they could focus on the above considering other aspects such as secondary users interac-
tions, different system models i.e. random spectrum access [21],etc.
3.1 Techniques
The most common tool to model interactions among secondary users is Game Theory
[23, 20, 19, 26, 27, 30, 31, 29, 28, 32, 25]. Game Theory is a mathematical study of situ-
ations involving individual rational decision makers with different (and often conflicting)
objectives. . In the framework of Game Theory, the interaction among those individuals
is a game. In that game, each of the them are players, whose actions ,moves or decisions,
bring an outcome to them (payoff ) and they are mapped to the set of possible situations of
the “world” a player can perceive in a strategy. Rationality refers to the players’ attitude
to select what maximizes their satisfactions.
It is clear to see that it adapts to the spectrum trading scenario: each user has the
goal of maximizing his satisfaction using a shared resource from an operator so their
actions have an influence on each other. In this case, spectrum trading can be seen as a
game, where users are the players, their moves would be the action of requesting spectrum
opportunities from the operator and the payoff could be the variation on their net utilities.
Once the model is set out, what is interesting in spectrum trading is to find if the
set of strategies of the players intersect so that the system is in equilibrium. There are
different types of equilibria, being Nash equilibrium (NE) the most popular, system status
where no player has motivation to unilaterally change his action because he would obtain
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a worse payoff. Nash equilibrium does not always exist as well as there can be infinite
NE points and a NE does not necessarily entail optimality. There are several ways to
understand the concept of “optimal” such as “Pareto optimal”, which states that a solution
to the game is Pareto optimal if there is no other solution to increase any player payoff
without worsening other. A more restricting solution would be “social optimal” similar to
Pareto optimal but involving all the entities of the transaction. Apart from that, some other
properties of the solutions may be studied, such as spectrum usage efficiency, fairness or
stability of algorithms. The key of these works is how to configure the game parameters,
such as utility functions, to model transactions in order to reach a convenient solution. To
illustrate these concepts, see figure 3.1. Let’s imagine a simple game consisting of two
players requesting bandwidth from an operator which will charge proportionally to their
aggregate demand. Both players would buy less bandwidth if the other player buys more
(as the cost will increase) but they have different utilities/demands/strategies which led to
the best responses graph on the the figure. Those best responses intersect in two points:
A and B, which are Nash equilibria: there each of the players is reacting to each other
with its best possible action so they have no incentive to change their actions. However
in this case (as usual), as it can be seen on the graph on the right, none of those points are
optimal. The collection of Pareto optimal points form the users Pareto front. In addition,
considering the operator’s profit, the social optimum may not be a point in that front∗ It
is worth commenting that, as it is represented here, the points of Pareto front and social
optimum of a particular game may not be equilibria so the efforts should be oriented to
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Figure 3.1: On the left: best response of each player to the other’s action. On the right,
utility received by each user
There are several different games and possible classifications attending to various as-
pects of them. One of them worth commenting in spectrum trading is whether players per-
form their actions simultaneously [19, 20, 23, 25, 30, 31] or sequentially, so players have
∗Users’ total utility versus operator’s profit can be represented in a similar graph with its own Pareto
front where the social optimum lays
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information about actions performed by players that moved first as in a Stackelberg game
ref:Simeone2008,ref:Zhang2009,ref:Yi2010,ref:Vazquez2010 and/or the game is played
along rounds so they know about moves made in previous rounds, as in dynamic/repeated
games [23]. In a Stackelberg game, at least one of the agents, the “leader”, makes its
decision first and the rest of the players (“followers”) react to it. The leader assumes ra-
tionality, that is to say, as the followers can see its decision before making their own , they
will choose their best possible responses, the ones that maximize their utilities function.
The solution to this game is the Stackelberg equilibrium, which is different from Nash
equilibrium, the leader receives a better payoff: it knows the followers’ best response and
using backward induction it can optimize its strategy, and this is the catch of this model:
the leader needs to know the followers’ true valuation of the trading good, which is an
unrealistic assumption in a competitive environment. In a dynamic game, players inter-
act, that is to say, execute an action, more than once which is based on previous moves by
them and/or the others. The advantage offered over static games is that it does not require
that each player knows a priori the strategy of the rest (as each strategy is the best response
to the strategy of others, and NE is a point where those best responses intersect), players
learn on each round by observing taken actions and payoffs and adapt theirs. However,
these algorithms are hard to develop, convergence is slower and they may not reach the
same solutions. But, at a cost of a growing complexity, they can reach more solutions
in a dynamic environment if they take into account future utilities/payoffs and/or infinite
horizons (infinite rounds), so they are continuosly adapting to variable situations (such as
real variations on supply and demand).
Another important classification refers to players’ attitude: non-cooperative or coop-
erative games. Non-cooperative games are most common in spectrum trading, because of
their simplicity and closeness to reality: each user is on a free-for-all share of resources
trying to maximize its satisfaction on its own, with no communication or help from other
users, which are competitors. However, most of the times this selfish behavior leads to
inefficient outcomes and different techniques are used to drive players to other equilibria
points. Cooperative games offer a way to avoid those situations mostly through commu-
nication between players, such as binding agreements enforced by a third party, “commit-
ments” (a player takes a binding action on him and informs the others so he can persuade
them to take convenient actions to him, like threads), bargaining [25]. In this sense, they
are closely related to dynamic games, specially infinite horizon games, where cooperation
is encouraged due to the long term relationship that could be established among players
and the possibility to punish those who don’t respect agreements in future actions.
One of the Game Theory branches that is receiving special attention is the one that
merged with a previous well-known trading model, auctions. As we will show later, an
auction can be seen as a game with incomplete information as it happens in a dynamic
game. Auctions will be discussed in a different section due to their high use and peculiar-
ities.
Regarding the operator/seller behavior on a monopoly, there are three possible options.
The most ordinary one, which gives them an incentive to grant access to users is optimiza-
tion of pricing [19, 23], i.e. users play a game where their strategies are the amount of
commodity they are going to request from the operator, given the price previously an-
nounced by him. That price will be set up by the operator as a result of optimization of his
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revenue under different constraints, taking into account the status of the environment and
information from users as willingness to pay. On the opposite side of this idea, another
case is when the operator literally plays the game, developing his own strategy, bargain-
ing... as seen on the section “Seller on the game” There is also the possibility where the
users also perform the optimization of price in a distributed manner as in [20].
Game Theory is not always used, there also many works where the trading process
relay entirely on optimization i.e. [21, 24, 22]: finding the values of some parameters such
that selected functions are maximized/minimized, subject to a number of constraints. In
the context of spectrum trading, these parameters usually are price per commodity unit
(often bandwidth or power), the constraints are related to degradation caps on primary
users’ activity and the goal of the optimization can be diverse (which applies to the pricing
optimization performed on games) and will be discussed later.
Depending on the form of the function to optimize and the constraints, different opti-
mization techniques are used, while the efforts are often oriented to formulate the problem
as a convex optimization problem (goals and constraints are all convex functions) or trying
to reduce it to one, due to mathematical advantages to solve them.
It is interesting to know that the equivalent to dynamic/repeated games exist in opti-
mization through the application of (stochastic) dynamic programming to solve Markov
Decision Processes [24]: a model that considers different states of a system (which could
be seen as each trading stage, i.e. time slots) in which one decision maker choose an
action based on that state and the state changes randomly and the decision maker receives
a payoff. The main difference with dynamic games are the fact that in optimization there
is only one centralized decision maker compared to the distributed nature of game theory,
however, there are techniques halfway between these two disciplines, such as considering
Nature as a player on the game (Stochastic games) or multiple decision makers (competi-
tive MDP).
3.2 Motivation
Going on to comment some of these works, H.Mutlu et al. [24] are focused on maximizing
profit of a spectrum owner from SUs’ payment for accessing its call center, considering
that charged price will vary as a function of the occupation of the system. That variation
on the charged price will also influence the arrival rate of SUs (decreasing with price)
and there is no associated cost to PU of sharing unused resources: damage to PUs is only
reflected as a monetary value punishment to the spectrum owner if any PU entering the
system is rejected because it is full. First they show an optimal pricing policy calculated
with stochastic dynamic programming using a MDP and considering that this varying
price makes cost less predictable to a SU and thus, reduces their demands, they obtain
a suboptimal threshold single-price policy which does not depend on the form of SUs’
demand functions but only on their support.
H.Yu et al. [19] show spectrum trading in the context of power control in a CDMA
system: focusing on a cell with a PU base station, PUs and SUs both trying to com-
municate with the BS, so the commodity in this market is uplink power. SUs play a
non-cooperative game of power given the price set by a optimization process on the PU’s
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BS. That optimization process contemplates the revenue obtained by charging some price-
per-power unit to SUs and does not consider any cost of sharing unused resources but a
fixed constraint on the power received from a SU, total power received from SUs and min-
imum SINR for a SU. A suboptimal algorithm (it is a non-convex problem) is presented
so that the allocation is sub-maximices revenue of PU and it’s efficient and fair among
SUs, understanding “fair” as charging more to those with a better channel quality and
bigger valuation of the power unit. However, it considers such private SU’s information
as known by the BS when, in fact, could be user in a malicious way by a SU to obtain
lower prices.
Using a very similar scenario, [22] introduce “quality discrimination spectrum trad-
ing”: a spectrum trading market where SUs are classified into multiple (discrete) cate-
gories according to their preference for a given spectrum quality when buying a channel,
where “quality” stands in the example used as maximum allowable transmission power.
All computation efforts are centered in the PU’s BS, who has to derive the optimal set of
qualities-prices and associate each SU consumer type one, so that PU’s revenue is max-
imized while making this associations (called “contracts”) incentive compatible to SUs,
that means, each SU from a type would have to find his associated quality-price as the
best option, even considering not to transfer at all. This solution improves PU incentive
by losing some aggregate utility of the system compared to the maximum social surplus.
Again in the context of power control , [20] aims to improve social optimality of
the resource sharing, considering that each CDMA channel is a multi-user interference
channel, that is to say, multiple SUs can share the same channel, having to consider mutual
interference. It uses a non-cooperative power game among SUs while price optimization is
also performed by them in a decentralized manner using different variations of a “iterative
water-filling” algorithm, depending on whether is preferred a faster convergence speed
but with the need of having SUs syncronized and correctly estimating information about
each other or a relaxed but slower version . In order to achieve that, the pricing function
obtained by the SUs is user-dependent and no matter which algorithm flavor is used,
it would require local information about SUs. They also develop a MAC protocol to
implement the exchange of messages needed.
D. Niyato and E.Hossain not only worked on market-equilibrium. In [23] they apply
a well known non-cooperative game to SUs, Cournot game, in which SUs compete for
the amount of spectrum they want (to maximize their utility functions) given the price
announced by the PU, taking into account that it charges them the same fixed price, pro-
portional to their total demand. This work is focused on maximizing the profit of SUs at
NE, but leaves the door open for the maximization of PU profit by stating that it could
perform price optimization. The most important contribution of this paper is a dynamic
game model formulation which frees SUs from the need to know the strategy adopted
by each user and their payoffs and only relies on SUs’ knowledge of the variation of the
profit obtained from PU under their different actions.
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3.3 Seller on the game
Although primary users/network always take part actively in the trading process, there are
some works where they literally enter the game as players [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 25, 32],
mainly acting as leaders in a Stackelberg game as in [26, 27, 28, 29].
This is the chosen method in some works where there is no bandwidth-for-money
trading, but bandwidth-for-cooperation instead [26, 27, 28]. The premise is as simple as
the usual trading: a primary user will lease some transmission opportunities if secondary
users, in turn, help the primary user on its transmission by acting as relays, which makes
the primary user to be able to increase its transmission rate.
In [26], time is divided into blocks where each block has three stages. On the first
stage, the primary user communicates with its intended receiver via direct link and sec-
ondary users receive the information too (broadcast). On the second stage, some sec-
ondary users re-transmit the same info to the primary receiver. Finally, those secondary
receivers can communicate with their intended secondary receivers. Before each of these
transmission blocks, the primary users tries to optimize its utility function by selecting
which secondary users it is willing to use as relays and how much time it will associate
to each stage, based, as said before, on knowledge about their best responses depending
on the system status (i.e. channel gains). After the primary user makes public its deci-
sion, the selected secondary users play a non-cooperative power control game where each
secondary user tries to maximize its utility taking into account that they will use the same
amount of power for cooperating with the primary user than for their own transmission.
That election includes the possibility not to transmit at all in case the bandwidth offered
by the primary user is not worth acting as relay. It is clear to see the Stackelberg model
and its leader-follower scheme matches perfectly this kind of problems.
J.Zhang and Q.Zhang [27] add to the previous work the thought that a primary user
has certain traffic demand and once it is satisfied, it will have no incentive in improving
its transmission rate and therefore it won’t be willing to permit secondary users access.
In order to avoid that situation, [27] proposes that secondary users should also pay some
monetary value to the primary. It also sets a different MAC of secondary users, TDMA,
rather than power control, claiming that simultaneous transmission of all secondary users
on an interference channel as [26] shows is unrealistic because an SNR constraint can not
be met. In [27] cooperative SUs play a non-cooperative payment selection game: their
actions are how much they are willing to pay and transmission time is divided among
them proportional to the amount they paid.
Chapter 4
Spectrum sellers’ competition
Until this section, only the relationship between one seller and a buyer or multiple buyers
has been studied. This may not be a natural or most typical situation, as it is highly likely
that more tan owner spectrum licensee (owner) on a region will be interested in selling,
and furthermore, it is a desirable situation from the point of view of resource exploitation
and users’ welfare because of the competition. However, as competition grows, spectrum
sellers’ profit diminishes and several dangers arise, such as demotivation to provide their
service and investments, aggressive market strategies to end up as a monopolist or forbid
entrance to newcomers, etc. so regulation may be needed to encourage competition while
keeping incentives for spectrum owners. For more on this see [12, 46]
This competition among sellers is introduced in most of these works on a three-layered
market model as in figure 4.1 composed of primary spectrum operators which obtain
spectrum through licenses from a regulatory entity (such as the FCC) and provide service
to a set of primary users on long term subcriptions, and secondary spectrum operators
which buy unused spectrum to the primary providers and sell it to secondary users in a
typically shorter time basis (even real-time/on demand). That is to say, the first layer
of the market would be the (i.e. auction) process where primary operators get spectrum
licenses, the second layer market involves those operators selling portions of that spectrum
to secondary operators in a larger time scale than secondary operators selling spectrum to
users in the third layer ∗. However a market model can have more than three layers, by
allowing secondary users to re-sell spectrum, establishing ternary, quaternary markets...
Most works on this section focus on secondary operators, where previous commented
works could be representing either the second stage market or the third one (depending
on the time scale).
The reason of existence of these virtual † intermediaries to do the secondary trading is
that they could focus on it, being near the end costumer and thus, crafting tailored plans
and/or adding innovative services [40, 48]. In addition, it is a way to ease the entrance
∗Not to be confused with the number of game stages modeling this markets: usually focus will be on the
second and third layers, so games will have three stages: spectrum investment (secondary operators buying
spectrum), spectrum pricing (secondary operators setting a price) and demand distribution (secondary users
selecting secondary operator
†
“Virtual” as they have no spectrum license and may not even have infrastructure as a Mobile Virtual
Network Operator MVNO for cellphones (i.e “Ting”, “Truphone” or”Straight Talk” in the USA)
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Figure 4.1: Three-layered market
to the market to a potentially new primary operator and so, improving users wellfare and
spectrum utilization as well as providing incentives for existing primary operators since
they’ll have the ability of selling their bandwidth excess without having to worry about
designing princing and/or marketing plans for secondary users to buy it.
As in previously cited works, pricing is still the most exhaustive issue studied but
adding to it new dimensions brought by competition and focusing on this middle layer:
spectrum differentiation/substitutability [34, 36, 35, 44], joint study of spectrum invest-
ment with pricing [36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45] ∗. There are also works outside this three-layered
market model [33, 34, 37, 47] even with a different relationship between primary and sec-
ondary operators [43]
Spectrum differentiation refers to the consideration of spectrum as an heterogeneous
good instead of the common assumption of all portions being equal in characteristics. The
“model” section of [34] explains it in more depth but basically lower frequency signals go
better through obstacles and can travel further at the cost of less amount of information
transmitted and less ability to directionalize the signal. Other reasons are that the spectrum
holes may or may not be contiguous blocks which may be needed for some transmission
technologies, different perceived QoS depending on the geographical distribution, number
of users on that operator... All this leads to different valuations by users depending on
their preferences and thus, different demands and services selection (even selection of
more than one operator although typically no demand split is considered as it would make
any analysis very complex) which enable more niche markets that should be taken into
account in pricing.
Focusing on secondary operators, intermediary entities with no spectrum licenses
∗L.Duan et al. works[39, 42] don’t really study sellers’ competition but they are closely related to its
other works featured in this section showing the same structure and dealing with investment as if they were
on a competitive environment
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ownership, makes possible to study the impact of spectrum purchase to owners on the
final price charged to secondary users. There are several ares of concern around spectrum
investment: some authors like J.Jia et al. on [36] assume that, no matter if the spectrum is
bought to the regulator or to primary users, these are long-term transactions (i.e. for years)
as legacy from the old command-and-control law framework, while secondary operators
are looking to satisfy secondary users’ needs almost on demand, so, they work trying
to adapt secondary operators real time dynamic pricing strategies to those long-term in-
vestment decisions. Another point of interest is that competition can also take place at
the investment stage among secondary operators either directly, where they are trying to
get “best quality” spectrum, i.e. [45], and/or they are charged based on their aggregate
demand [36] or indirectly, as the bandwidth amount offered by each operator to the sec-
ondary users and its aggregate total will influence prices and profits [40]. And while most
of the works on spectrum trading only consider leasing as the way to obtain spectrum,
some research on influence of spectrum sensing [39, 42] or sharing spectrum bands [37].
Regarding those works showing a different market structure, in [33] a variation of a
private commons regime is modeled (the authors call it “mixed commons/property-rights)
regulated and centralized in a Spectrum Policy Server per geographic domain. When each
user enters the system, it connects to this broker which obtains its location and a function
called “acceptance probability of services” related to its utility function. Then the SPS
stars an iterative bidding process of service offers among operators where the winning bid
is the one with the most acceptance probability, which is shown to the user and accepted
with that probability. The objective of this framework is to maximize users’ utilities but
that doesn’t mean optimizing bandwidth usage or SPS profit and this iterative bidding
hurts operators’ profit. An extension to a multiuser environment is also studied where
the SPS would partition the available bandwidth among each bidding process looking to
optimize its own revenue which is proven to be the same as optimizing bandwidth usage,
however, each chunk is treated as before so there is a loss on resource allocation and
operators’ profit.
Y.Xing et al. [34] thought that a centralized controller didn’t match the reality of a
situation that is distributed by nature and proposed a model with only operators and users
interacting directly, where users perceive spectrum as an heterogeneous good and with
different valuations of it depending on their application and distance to the operators.
Users also have different sensibilities to either “quality” (understood as any valuation that
a user can make) or price (more interested in one versus the other) and a limited budget and
QoS minimal requirements. Based on that, they sort operators and choose their preferred.
Operators play a non-cooperative game to set their prices (given fixed qualities) assuming
full information of this and a stochastic learning game when there is lack of it where they
update their prices based on the profit they obtained. The authors also did a mini-study of
cooperation among groups of providers showing that even non-cooperating ones benefit
from it. One of the interesting results show that cost has a huge impact on profit and
low-end sellers may end up gaining more. Price war phenomenon in also observed under
some circumstances (where cycles among different equilibrium points take place) This
work is one of the most complete in the area but it does not contemplate dynamics such
as supply/demand variations with time.
With a different perspective, [37] investigates a duopoly of operators which have a
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fixed part of spectrum and share another band but they can only use it under congestion
and proportionally to their excess traffic. Operators play a one shot non-cooperative game
on price on each time slot, given fixed capacities of spectrum and a demand depending
only on minimum price perceived, taking into account that users will choose the operator
with lowest perceived price. This perceived price is a congestion price: users believe
they are charged per successfully transmitted packet when in reality they are charged per
submitted packet as announced price is the one obtained on the game multiplied by the
average number of retries needed to transmit it (which can be estimated by each operator
based on its received demand/capacity ratio). A numerical example of NE is provided
where the interesting fact is that it is reached when both operators are saturated, however
it does not provide insights on how to avoid trivial equilibrium (0,0) when total demand
is less than total capacity, the effect of a possible usage cost of the unlicensed band and
the extension to more than to operators. Regulation is suggested as a bigger shared band
would benefit user welfare but decrease operators’ profit.
S. Dixit et al. [47] are also interested in a different market model, without brokers
or any centralized entity and no information sharing, as they consider that the cost of
such that infrastructure would be high and operators would not be willing to share any
information on a competitive environment. Instead, the authors propose that the primary
base stations should be the ones to also serve secondary users selling directly their unused
spectrum (strictly unused. No trade is considered of primary users’ QoS for revenue from
secondary users, although it considers a fixed cost for providing the service). In order
to be completely decentralized, they set prices based on local info such as remaining
bandwidth. This model is transformed when competition takes place to a static non-
cooperative gane, where in order to avoid inefficiency of a Nash Equilibrium, service
differentiation is proposed based on their distance from user, although it is not explained
in detail. An extension to a dynamic pricing strategy (without calculating equilibrium
on competition, which may be too complex) is proposed, where price charged to users
increases for each accepted SU.
L. Guijarro et al. in [43] is close to the three-layered market model (it is a three-layered
market indeed) and studies dynamic spectrum access but á la Mobile Virtual Network
Operator, that is to say, when the virtual operator buys spectrum to the licensed one, it
becomes its competitor for a common pool of users and play a non-cooperative game on
price per subscription which is taken into account by both operators on the sale. The sale
is the result of a bargaining game where price would depend on the bargaining power
of the licensed operator (as an example, full power is assumed so licensed operator is
looking to optimize its profit) but the bandwidth is not determined and only constrained.
Bandwidth could be adjusted depending on the objective: maximize operators’ profit, user
welfare or social welfare (all entities benefit).
J. Jia and Q.Zhang. in [36] did the first joint study of spectrum investment and pricing
and set the baseline framework for these studies, with a three stage non-cooperative game
on spectrum investment, pricing and secondary users service selection, adding spectrum
heterogeneity. This type of multi-stage games are solved using “backward induction”:
studying how users would react to prices (based on their utility functions), each secondary
operator can analyze which would its best response on setting its price and knowing that
each operator can set how much spectrum would it lease from the primary. The authors
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also propose a solution where secondary operators can only know their profit functions,
breaking the game up into two dynamic games: first a short-term price adjustment game
and then a long-term spectrum leasing adjustmente once the previous game is stabilized,
with the disadvantage that it takes long time to reach equilibrium
L. Duan et al. works [40, 41] use this same structure but secondary operators don’t
directly compete in sepectrum investment (spectrum cost is fixed and the same for both,
it does not depend on their aggregate demand), although they claim to be first on joint-
studying spectrum leasing and pricing taking into account users heterogeneity, that is to
say, different transmission conditions for them. They use different functions on the math-
ematical development which allow them to obtain threshold structures for the decisions
of each stage, and a fair and predictable SNR for users. In addition, they prove that oper-
ators’ profit gets reduced only by a 20% compared to a monopoly. In [39, 42] they do not
consider operators competition but they keep using the same market structure with a very
interesting variation: operators first try to get spectrum from the spectrum owner by sens-
ing and then by leasing. So, these works study how much to invest on leasing (which is
more expensive than sensing), taking into account the uncertainity in obtaining spectrum
through sensing (although it is found free on sensing, it may be occupied at the moment
of transmission so it can not be used). Under this scheme, operator’s expected profit and
users’ utilites increase.
Chapter 5
A well-studied market mechanism:
auctions
Auctions have been used along History to sell items and specially to sell limited common
goods [55, 54] because of their notion of giving and item to the one that valuates it most
and because the transaction can take place in public and remove suspicious about the
government benefiting any buyer for a bribe.
An auction is controlled by an auctioneer, which in spectrum trading is usually the
spectrum owner or an external regulator authority. In its most basic form, buyers submit
“bids” according to their valuation of the item and the buyer with the highest bid and thus,
the one who valuates the trading good most, gets the item and pays for it depending on its
bid. By assigning the spectrum to the ones that valuate them most, social welfare could be
maximized. However, focusing on that as a strict goal could lead to starvation to buyers
with less “bid” power (less budget) , discourage them from competition and finally, end
up worsening social welfare [56].
Game Theory is also used to study auctions, which can be seen as games where bidders
are the players and the strategies are the bids. These games would be games of imperfect
information and that is the strongest point of auctions related to spectrum trading: unlike
most of the previously commented works, they don’t assume the knowledge of the private
valuations of the goods by the buyers and it is in the best interest of buyers to submit
bids accordingly to their true valuations ∗. Indeed, the biggest concern of most works
on spectrum trading auctions is to develop cheat-proof mechanisms such as second price
auctions or VCG auctions while trying to reduce their computational complexities [50,
58, 57, 51], however, they are still vulnerable to collusion attacks.
As it happens with games, there are several types of auctions and the challenge is to
properly design its rules to achieve different sub-objectives. However, it is unlikely that
the seller would simply let the auction play by some rules and accept its result, without
really getting involved in it (even if it is the auctioneer) and there are several mechanisms
for it to intervene, such as setting a reserve price (it won’t sell unless bids reached some
value) or multi-unit double auctions, where sellers also bid with the price they are willing
to sell [52, 53]
∗In reality, that’s not exactly true. The key is that they are more efficient under liars
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Auctions may not achieve points as near to social optimum as market-equilibrium or
optimization but they are simpler to implement and faster to converge, however, they are
not as fast as some games and it is hardly suitable for real time markets. In addition,
auctions usually need an auctioneer so they don’t get along well with ad-hoc networks.
Chapter 6
Future research lines and conclusions
We have shown the variety of economic models used to study spectrum trading and the
special characteristics of spectrum as a trading good and its agents. Apart from the ten-
dency to unify more of these aspects on more and more complex models, there are the
following open challenges:
• Communication overload: the cost associated to information exchange among agents
is not usuall considered, understanding “cost” as the resources needed to do so (such
as power) and/or delays that prevent real time trading.
• Protection against misconducts/nasty agents: most of the spectrum trading algo-
rithms are based on the knowledge of agents private information and/or trusting that
they would report their true valuations but in reality they have incentives to trans-
mit wrong information so that they would gain more profit at a cost of unfairness,
system disequilibrium... Other negative situations could be malicious cooperations
among providers or users to rise/lower prices.
• Lack of rationality and incomplete information: in that sense, similar failures can
occur in a system when that information gets lost or it is faulty. In addition, Game
Theory assumes that players are rationals but does not offer protection against fail-
ures in their decisions due to decisions in these situations.
• Dyanmic programming/games: most works on spectrum trading consider a one-
shot interaction among agents without taking into account future payoffs, priorities
on trading due to previous agreements, that is to say, they do not take into account
previous or future trading history, which could be used to maximize satisfaction in
long-term. There are mathematical tools to implement this but it has not been used
much due to the additional complexity they introduce.
This work tried to show a panoramic view of spectrum trading with the intention of being a
starting point to enter on it. In this work it can be seen that spectrum trading is a relatively
new field of study where there are several approches to implement it but these are far
from real applications due to its complexities. Game Theory is one of the most used tools
because of its natural adaptability to a decentralized and independent decision making on
networks around spectrum trading.
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Abstract
Public administrations assign the spectrum bands to wireless operators by a license scheme.
Generally, operators gain spectrum licenses by bidding for them in public auction pro-
cesses (primary market). The increasing demand of spectrum and the existence of spec-
trum holes have revealed the inefficiency of this mechanism. One practical and econom-
ically feasible way to solve this inefficiency is to allow spectrum owners to sell their
spectrum opportunities in a secondary market. In order to do this in real-time, a protocol
is required to support negotiations on access price, channel holding time, etc, between the
spectrum owner and secondary users. In this work, we consider the bid-auction model, in
which secondary users bid for the spectrum of a single spectrum owner. We explore the
possibilities of a formal design based on a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation
which has to include the trade-off between the blocking probability of primary users and
the expected revenue.
Introduction
Cognitive radio refers to a set of technologies aiming to increase the efficiency in the
use of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum. Wireless communication systems are offering
increasing bandwidth to their users, therefore the spectrum demand is becoming higher.
However, RF spectrum is scarce and operators gain access to it by a licensing scheme
in which public administrations assign a frequency band to each operator. Currently,
this allocation is static in the sense that a licensed band can only be accessed by one
operator and their clients (primary users or PUs). However, it is a known fact that while
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some RF bands are heavily used at some locations and at particular times, many other
bands remain largely underused [1]. The consequence is that, while the spectrum scarcity
problem hinders the development of new wireless applications, there are large portions of
unoccupied spectrum (spectrum opportunities).
Cognitive radio provides the mechanisms allowing unlicensed (or secondary) users
(SUs) to access licensed RF bands by exploiting spectrum opportunities. It is crucial
for this opportunistic access to be performed with the least possible impact on the qual-
ity of service provided to licensed users. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) refers to the
mechanism that manages the spectrum use in response to system changes (e.g. available
channels, unlicensed user requests) according to certain objectives (e.g. maximize spec-
trum usage) and subject to some constraints (e.g. minimum blocking probability for LUs).
DSA can be implemented in a centralized or distributed fashion. In the former one, a cen-
tral controller collects all the information required about spectrum usage and transmission
requirements of secondary users in order to make the spectrum access decision, which is
generally derived from the solution of some optimization problem.
MAC protocols for DSA can also include spectrum trading features. In situations of
low spectrum usage, the licensed operator may decide to sell spectrum opportunities to
unlicensed users in the secondary spectrum market. In order to do this in real-time, a
protocol is required to support negotiations on access price, channel holding time, etc,
between the spectrum owner and secondary users. There are several models for spectrum
trading. In this work, we consider the bid-auction model, in which secondary users bid
for the spectrum of a single spectrum owner.
This paper addresses the design of centralized DSA MAC protocols comprising dy-
namic spectrum auction. We explore the possibilities of a formal design based on a
Markov decision process (MDP) formulation (Section A). We survey previous works on
this issue (Section A) and propose, in Section A, a design framework to balance the grade-
of-service (given by the blocking probability for LUs) of different user categories and the
expected economic revenue . This trade-off can be managed in two ways. One consists
of computing a single objective value by combining the expected values of the blocking
probability and the revenue. The weights assigned to each objective determine the point
in the Pareto front where the attained policy lies. The other approach, which is presented
in Section A, is to set a constraint in one of the objectives and solve for the other one. This
strategy results in a constrained MDP formulation (CMDP) and the policies obtained are
not necessarily deterministic.
Related Work
In [62] the spectrum broker controls the access of secondary users based on a threshold
rule computed by means of an MDP formulation with the objective of minimizing the
blocking probability of secondary users. In order to cope with the non-stationarity of
traffic conditions, the authors propose a finite horizon MDP instead of an infinite hori-
zon one. The drawback is that the policy cannot be computed off-line, imposing a high
computational overhead on the system.
Tang et. al. study in [63] several admission control schemes at a centralized spectrum
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manager. The objective is to meet the traffic demands of secondary users, increasing
spectrum utilization efficiency while assuring a grade of service in terms of blocking
probability to primary users. Among the schemes analyzed, the best performing one is
based on a constrained Markov decision process (CMDP).
In [52], spectrum trading from LUs to SUs is modeled as a non-cooperative dynamic
game, using a Markov chain to describe groups of SUs buying opportunities from LUs.
Given its distributed implementation, the main goal of this approach is finding the sys-
tem’s equilibrium. The objective in [57] is maximizing the profit of primary users, with
especial interest in assuring bidding truthfulness.
Our paper focuses on centralized dynamic trading of spectrum channels. The central-
ized framework allows us to explore the use of MDP and CMDP formulations to balance
benefit and grade of service for LUs. Note the main advantages of this approach is that it
assures operating at global optimum and reduces the computational effort at the SUs.
System model
The model includes a spectrum bidding procedure, in which secondary users offer a price,
within a finite countable set of prices for mathematical tractability, for the use of a channel.
Taking into account a trade-off between the blocking probability of licensed users and
the expected benefit obtained from spectrum rental, secondary users can be accepted or
rejected.
As explained in the introduction, public administrations assign the spectrum bands
to wireless operators by a license scheme. Generally, operators gain spectrum licenses
by bidding for them in public auction processes. We refer to this spectrum assignment
framework as primary market. The increasing demand of spectrum and the existence
of spectrum holes have revealed the inefficiency of this mechanism. One practical and
economically feasible way to solve this inefficiency is to allow spectrum owners to sell
their spectrum opportunities in a secondary market. In contrast to the primary market,
the secondary operates in real-time. Secondary users, that may be operators without a
spectrum license, submit their bids for spectrum opportunities to the spectrum owner,
who determines the winner or winners by giving them access to the band and charging
them the bidding price.
Incoming traffic is characterized by a classic Poisson model. Licensed users arrive
with a rate of λL arrivals per unit of time. The arrival rate for unlicensed users is denoted
by λU . The licensed spectrum managed by the central controller is assumed to be divided
into channels (or bands) with equal bandwidth. Each user occupies a single channel.
The average holding times for licensed and unlicensed users are given by 1/µL and 1/µU
respectively, where µL and µU denote the departure rate for each class. Because a Poisson
traffic model is considered, both the inter-arrival time and the channel holding times are
exponentially distributed random variables for both user classes. The model can be easily
extended including more user classes, the probability that a user occupies two or more
channels, and so on. Essentially the procedure is the same, but the Markov chain would
comprise more states as more features are considered in the model. In this model, the state
of the Markov chain is determined by the number of channels k occupied by licensed users


























Figure A.1: Diagram of the auction based access model. Secondary users (SU) can offer
up to m different bid prices. Each bid offer is assigned a probability. The access policy
decides upon each offer according to the price offered and the system’s state.
(LU), and the number of channels s occupied by secondary users (SU). Because spectrum
is a limited resource, there is a finite number N of channels. Figure A.1 depicts a diagram
of the model and its parameters. Note that we can map all the possible combinations of
(k, s) for 0 ≤ k ≤ N , 0 ≤ s ≤ N and k + s ≤ N to a single integer i such that
0 ≤ i ≤
N (N + 1)
2
+N + 1. (A.1)
The number in the right hand side of A.1 is the total number of states. Let NT denote this
number.
For mathematic tractability, the bidding prices are classified into a finite set of values:
B = {b1, b2, . . . bm} given in money charged per unit of time. Each price on this set has
a probability pi, i = 1 . . . m to be offered by an incoming user. Obviously
∑m
i=1 pi = 1.
Figure A.1 depicts the model described.
The model described above consists of a continuous-time Markov chain.In this case,
the objective of the MDP is to obtain the maximum economic profit with the minimum
impact on the licensed users. In the framework of MDPs we have to define the actions
and the costs of these actions. According to the objetive, the expected cost is obtained as a
linear combination of the blocking probability of the primary users and the income benefit
from secondary users. By adjusting the weighting factors we can compute a Pareto front
for both elements. Let g(i, u) denote the instantaneous cost of taking action u at state i.
The control u at each stage determines the admitted and rejected bidding prices. Logically,
the control should be defined as a threshold, i.e. when u = i only bids equal or above
pi are admitted. For notation convenience, the control u = m + 1 indicates that no bid
is accepted. The per-stage reward function g(i, u) is given by the linear combination of
gL(i, u), defined as:
gL(i, u) =
{
1, if i ≡ (k, s) and k + s = N
0, otherwise
(A.2)
where the symbol “≡” denotes equivalence, i.e. i maps a state (k, s) such that k+ s = N ;
and gU(i, u) defined, in this model, as the expected benefit at stage i when decision u is
made. Therefore g(i, u) = αgL(i, u) + βgU(i, u) where the scalars α and β are weighting
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factors. Note that β < 0 since the objective is to minimize the average expected cost given
by g(i, u). Let Bi denote the expected income when an unlicensed user whose bidding
price is bi is accepted. Since the average channel holding time for unlicensed users is
1/µU , then Bi = bi/µU . Given a control u, P (r|u) denotes the conditional probability






, if r ≥ u
0, otherwise
(A.3)
Let us define g˜U(i, u, j) as the average benefit associated to the transition from state i to
state j. Its expression is




r=1BrP (r|u) , if j = i+ 1
0, otherwise
(A.4)
where pU = λU/(λU + λL) denotes the probability that the next arrival corresponds to a
secondary user. Therefore, the per-stage benefit gU(i, u) is given by
gU(i, u) =
∑NT





We can formulate the auxiliary discrete-time average cost problem for the model de-
scribed. The equation providing the optimum average cost λ is
h˜ (i) = minu∈{0,1}
[










for i = 1, . . . , n, where vi(u) is the transition rate out of state i. The structure of this
problem also anticipates a threshold-type solution. In this case, there will be a set of
thresholds, one per bidding price. By properly adjusting the weighting factors α and β we
can also compute a Pareto front allowing us to determine the maximum possible benefit
for a given blocking objective for the licensed users.
Constrained MDP
So far, the approach to merge several objectives consisted on combining them into a single
objective by means of a weighted sum and solving the problem as a conventional MDP.
However, when several objectives concur in an MDP problem, the formulation strategy
may consist on optimizing one of them subject to constraints on the other objectives.
This strategy results in a CMDP formulation of the problem. Solving MDPs by iterative
methods such as policy or value iteration allows us to find deterministic policies, i.e.
policies that associate each system’s state i ∈ S to a single control u ∈ U(i), where U(i)
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is a subset of U containing the controls allowed in state i. However, these policies do
not, in general, solve CMDP problems. Instead, the solution of CMDPs is a randomized
policy, defined as a function that associates each state to a probability distribution defined
over the elements in U(i).
There are mainly two approaches to solve CMDPs, linear programming (LP) and La-
grangian relaxation of the Bellman’s equation. This paper follows the former one. Each
feasible LP formulation relies on the use of the dual variables φ (i, u), defined as the
stationary probability that the system is in state i and chooses action u under a given
randomized stationary policy. The problems addressed in this paper result, under every
stationary policy, in a truncated birth-death process, since primary users are always ac-
cepted. In consequence, every resulting Markov chain is irreducible, in other words, it
is recurrent and there are not transient states. Moreover, the state and action spaces are
finite. Under these circumstances, as shown in [60], every feasible solution of the LP
problem corresponds to some randomized stationary policy. Therefore, if the constrained
problem is feasible, then there exists an optimal randomized stationary policy.
The LP approach consists of expressing the objective and the constraints in terms of

















The constraints are defined similarly to the main objective: each constraint impose a













where gL (x(t), u(t)) is the real-valued function providing the per-stage cost associated to






Given the characteristics of the problem (finite state and action spaces and recurrent













gL (i, u)φ (i, u) (A.12)
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respectively. In addition, the following conditions must be hold by the dual variables:∑
u∈U(j)





pi,j (u)φ (i, u) (A.13)




φ (i, u) = 1, (A.14)
which, together with φ (j, u) ≥ 1 for i ∈ S and u ∈ U(i) correspond to the definition
of φ (i, u) as a limiting average state action frequency. In consequence, the LP for the






















φ (i, u) = 1
φ (j, u) ≥ 1
(A.15)
Assuming that the problem is feasible and φ∗ is the optimal solution of the LP problem






for cases where the sum in the denominator is nonzero. Otherwise, the state is transitory
and the control is irrelevant. Note that qµ∗(i) (u) denotes the probability of choosing action
u at state i under policy µ∗.
Numerical Results
We will consider three scenarios characterized by the asymmetry between the traffic in-
tensity of licensed and unlicensed users. In every scenario, the average holding time is
equal for every user, independently of their type. Therefore the service rate µL =µU =
5. Assuming that the time unit is an hour, this results in an average holding time of 12
minutes per connection. The total traffic (λ = λL + λU ) is 40 calls/h, which results in a
total incoming traffic of 8 Erlangs. In a wireless cell covering 2.5 km2 of urban area (cell
radius equal to 400 m), with 2000 people per km2 and a 10% aggregate market penetra-
tion (licensed and unlicensed users), the number of covered users is around 500, and the
resulting traffic intensity is 0.016 Erlangs per user. The number of available channels is
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set to N = 10, in order to evaluate the system in a relatively congested situation. With the
assumed traffic intensity we can estimate the blocking probability of the system for the
aggregate traffic by means of the well-known Erlang’s B formula (see [64]):







where n is the number of channels and ρ denotes the utilization factor. In our case ρ=λ/µL
= λ/µU . According to this formula, if the system accepted every incoming user, the total
blocking probability would be E (10, 8)=0.12. As we will see, this probability is an upper
bound for the blocking probability of the primary users, which are always accepted if the
system has any available channel, and a lower bound for the secondary users.
The three scenarios are summarized in Table A.1.
parameter scenario 1 scenario 2 scenario 3
λL (calls/h) 30 20 10
λU (calls/h) 10 20 30
µL=µU (calls/h) 5 5 5
N 10 10 10
Table A.1: Parameters values at the three scenarios of the priority based access problem.
Additionally we define three classes of secondary users (SU), characterized by the
price that they offer per minute of channel occupation. The bid offers per class are: class
1: 0.01 $/m, class 2: 0.02 $/m and class 3: 0.03 $/m. We define the probability of an
SU incoming call being of each class. The SU class probability distribution is: class 1
probability: 0.5, class 2 probability: 0.3 and class 3 probability: 0.2. We summarize SU
class definition in Table A.2.
SU class class 1 class 2 class 3
offered price ($/m) 0.01 0.02 0.03
probability 0.5 0.3 0.2
Table A.2: Classification of SU in terms their bid offers and their probabilities.
Note that both the offered prices and their probability distributions are static, i.e. they
do not change over time and are independent of the system occupation. It is not com-
pletely unrealistic taking into account typical tariff policies of wireless operators. In this
environment the class structure and the probability distribution may be seen as types of
contracts for secondary users and market penetration of each type of contract respectively.
However, for a more dynamical auction process, where bidders are able to change their
bid offers adaptively, the model should be revised. One possibility would be to define
one probability distribution for each state. More detailed modeling strategies would in-
crease the complexity of the MDP solving algorithm or even make them intractable. This
is a classic problem of MDP formulation, known as the curse of dimensionality and is
typically addressed by means of the heuristic approach of approximate dynamic program-
ming.
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(c) scenario 3
Figure A.2: Pareto fronts obtained for the auction-based access in scenario 1 (a), scenario
2 (b) and scenario 3 (c)
Figure A.2 shows the Pareto fronts for the auction-based system in the three scenar-
ios. It can be observed that, for the same traffic intensity (the three scenarios receive 40
calls per unit of time) when the traffic share of the secondary users is higher (scenarios
with higher number) the Pareto front moves away from the y-axis, i.e. the income ob-
tained from secondary users increases and it also approaches the x-axis, i.e. the blocking
probability of the licensed users diminishes. It is interesting to check that, especially in
scenarios 2 and 3, a very small increment of the blocking probability of licensed users
can multiply the benefit obtained from spectrum leasing by a factor of 2 or 3. On the
other hand, these figures also indicate that once the income surpasses certain threshold,
Pareto-optimal policies can only produce small increments of the income by dramatically
rising the blocking probability.
A graphical representation of the policies can be observed in Fig. A.3. Bars represents
the lowest accepted class (bid offer) at each state. States where bar has zero height corre-
spond to states where every secondary user is rejected, independently of its bid offer. As
expected, as the traffic intensity of the primary users reduces respect that of the secondary
users, there are more states where secondary users are admitted in the system, and lower
bids are accepted. It is interesting that it is the total number of occupied channels what
determines the policy (as the symmetry of the policy reveals) independently of the type of
users in occupying them (primary or secondary).
Conclusions
This paper proposes an MDP framework for centralized bid-auction access to the spec-
trum by SUs. The SUs are classified according to the price they are willing to pay for
the use of the spectrum. The main issue of the problem addressed is that two contrary
objectives coexist: to reduce blocking probability for licensed users and to increase the
income received from spectrum leasing. For this problems there does not exist an optimal
policy, but a set of Pareto optimal policies. We have shown how to compute policies at
the Pareto front by weighting the objectives in a MDP problem or by reformulating the
problem as a constrained MDP. Numerical solutions of the proposed equations shows the
influence of traffic share on system’s performance and on the structure of Pareto-optimal
policies.





























































Figure A.3: Graphical representation of the policies for the auction-based access in sce-




Las comunicaciones inalámbricas necesitan, entre otros recursos, de espectro radioeléc-
trico, el cual es un recurso finito. Agencias gubernamentales como la ECC en Europa,
Ofcom en Reino Unido y FCC en los Estados Unidos, proporcionan acceso al mismo a
través de licencias fijas a largo plazo para grandes áreas geográficas. La cada vez más
creciente demanda de espectro debido al crecimiento y popularización de los servicios
móviles ha dejado a estas políticas obsoletas ya que casi todo el espectro ya ha sido asig-
nado.
Una gran mejora en la eficiencia del uso del espectro podría ser posible gracias al
desarrollo de las “radios cognitivas”, [2], radios que son capaces de recabar información
acerca de su entorno radio y adaptar su parámetros de transmisión de acuerdo con lo que
han descubierto. En el escenario más típico, los operadores y/o usuarios sin licencia (tam-
bién llamados operadores/usuarios secundarios) con éste equipo buscarían fragmentos
de espectro sin utilizar en cualquier lugar del tiempo, espacio, frecuencia y/o potencia de
transmisión, conocidos como “agujeros en el espectro”, y usarlos para sus propias trans-
misiones bajo ciertas restricciones para la protección de los operadores y/o usuarios con
licencia (operadores/usuarios primarios)
En cualquier caso, el mejor aprovechamiento del espectro para dar cobertura a la de-
manda y a nuevos servicios puede chocar con la reticencia de los operadores ya licencia-
dos, pues cualquiera de estas aproximaciones incurre en ciertos costos a éstos, amén del
hecho de que éstos ya hicieron un desembolso por la licencia: cambios en las infraestruc-
turas ya establecidas, posibles perjuicios en su calidad de servicio por interferencias, re-
ducción de beneficios por competencia incrementada... De los distintos mecanismos para
mejorar la eficiencia en el uso del especto, el comercio automatizado del mismo (“Spec-
trum trading”) tiene como ventaja el que provee incentivos económicos a estos operadores
ya establecidos, de tal manera que se estimula su cooperación y no se desmotiva su in-
versión y la de posibles futuros operadores primarios. éste es el principal problema que
abordan los trabajos en esta área. Al mismo tiempo, el introducir valor económico al
espectro es una herramienta de asignación de recursos eficiente que previene su infrauti-
lización , y que podría incluso ser autorregulada (si se opta por la creación de mercados
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de espectro sin intervención y se consigue un régimen de plena competencia). Aparte de
esto, las redes cognitivas presentan un vasto rango de retos tecnológicos [9]
Trabajos previos en Economías no son fácilmente trasladables al comercio de espec-
tro por grandes diferencias tanto en los agentes que forman parte de las transacciones
como por peculiaridades del bien con el que se comercia. Respecto de los agentes, son
agentes automáticos (aunque por ejemplo las transacciones automáticas en Bolsa están
empezando a utilizarse [49]); su oferta y su demanda puede variar en tiempo real pues las
necesidades de transmitir dependen de la generación de información, que puede cambiar
rápidamente; y el hecho de que no suelen tener ni completa ni fideligna información del
mercado debido a la complejidad en que incurriría especialmente en redes ad-hoc. En
cuanto al espectro, a diferencia de otros bienes, también puede variar sus características
y la percepción de las mismas por partes de las entidades de la transacción. Asimismo,
una misma porción de espectro puede ser valorada de manera distinta entre compradores
dependiendo de la aplicación que vayan a darle. Además, es un bien que puede ser reuti-
lizado geográficamente, cuyo uso puede ser simultaneado por varios agentes, en el que la
actividad de unos puede degradar la de otros en la misma banda o adyacentes...
Nuestra contribución en este campo es servir como introducción a la inmensa ca-
suística en los trabajos de comercio automatizado de espectro intentando diferenciar los
distintos sub-problemas que aborda y las diferentes técnicas que se usan, con especial
atención a los trabajos más recientes, y con una visión esencialmente didáctica que se
traslada directamente a la estructura de nuestra exposición, tratando los trabajos en orden
creciente de complejidad de su estructura. En la sección 2 se presentan monopolios. En
la sección 3 se estudian situaciones más típicas con varios vendedores. Por último en la
sección 4 se muestran futuras líneas de estudio y conclusiones.
Cuando “es cosa de dos”
Las bases de cualquier transacción en general es el caso en el que tiene lugar entre sólo
dos entidades. El caso más sencillo es en el que una de esas entidades, el “vendedor”
quiere cambiar oportunidades de transmisión de su espectro que él no usa, por un valor
económico, el más alto posible, mientras que la otra entidad, ‘el “comprador”, está in-
teresado en ese bien pero quiere pagar tan poco como sea posible. Aunque esta situación
pueda parecer simplista, es útil no ya sólo como marco base de comprensión, que también
puede asemejarse a un escenario real cuando las redes primarias y secundarias tengan una
estructura centralizada y por ende la transacción se negociara entre las estaciones bases.
Ver 2.1.
Para el comprador, por tanto, existe un compromiso entre su interés por el bien ofre-
cido, la cantidad y el coste de su adquisición, que se expresa en la “función de utilidad”,
que es una medida cuantitativa del grado de satisfacción que le produce al comprador di-
cho bien. De esa función puede obtenerse la función de demanda, que expresa cuánto de
ese bien debería comprar dado un precio para maximizar su satisfacción. Por otro lado y
de manera similar, el vendedor también tiene un compromiso entre el beneficio que ob-
tiene de la venta de su espectro y el coste de vender ese espectro: al disponer de menor
espectro sobrante puede no ser capaz de satisfacer un incremento en la demanda de los
usuarios primarios, mayor interferencia, etc. aparte de costes fijos por la inversión en
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infraestructura. Este compromiso se expresa en la “función de beneficios” y derivándola
respecto de la cantidad de bien que vender, se obtiene la función de oferta, que muestra
cuánto del bien debería venderse dado un precio para maximizar su satisfacción.
Una solución a este conflicto de intereses entre vendedor y comprador es propuesto
por D.Niyato y E.Hossain en varios de sus trabajos [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] y está basada en
el modelo de oferta y demanda de Microeconomía, , donde el precio varía hasta que se
equilibra en un punto de ambas se iguala, con ciertas ayudas en la formulación para poder
eliminar la restricción de que el mercado tenga que estar en plena competencia.
Monopolios
Los siguientes trabajos: [23, 20, 24, 19, 22, 26, 27] todavía muestran una sola entidad
como vendedor mientras que introducen varios usuarios/operadores secundarios. éstos
toman sus propias decisiones independientes, si bien se influencian mutuamente. La may-
oría de estos trabajos, tanto en esta sección como en general, se centran en la optimización
del beneficio del operador primario [23, 24, 22], mientras que otro foco importante de esta
sección corresponde a la utilización de dar valor económico al espectro como herramienta
para reparto eficiente del mismo [20, 19].
La herramienta más común para modelar las interacciones entre los usuarios secun-
darios es Teoría de Juegos: [23, 20, 19, 26, 27]. Teoría de Juegos es el estudio matemático
de situaciones que involucran a individuales racionales que toman decisiones sobre difer-
entes (y a menudo en conflicto) objetivos.
Hay un enorme rango de juegos diferentes. Un tipo de juego muy interesante son
los juegos dinámicos/juegos con repetición como [23], en los que la interacción entre ju-
gadores ocurre más de una vez y los movimientos pasados pueden observarse e influir en
futuras acciones. La gran ventaja que ofrecen estos juegos frente a los estáticos es que
no requieren el conocimiento de las estrategias de todos los jugadores. Frente a ello, en
un juego dinámico los jugadores van aprendiendo en cada iteración si bien estos algorit-
mos son más difíciles de plantear/analizar, son más lentos y no tienen por qué converger
exactamente a la misma solución. Por otra parte y a costa de crecer en complejidad,
pueden conseguir mejores soluciones al considerar conceptos como utilidades/recompen-
sas futuras y/o tener horizonte infinito y por ende, estar continuamente adaptándose a
situaciones de variabilidad (i.e. de demanda, oferta...).
Una rama de la Teoría de Juegos que está recibiendo gran atención es la que se ha
fusionado con un modelo económico muy trabajado anteriormente, las subastas. Las
subastas pueden verse como un juego con información parcial, siendo éste su punto fuerte:
se usa para vender ítems basándose en la valoración privada que cada comprador hace del
mismo, sin asumir como en la mayoría de trabajos expuestos aquí que las funciones de
utilidad de los jugadores son conocidas por todos (algo que sería improbable que ocurra
en un escenario real: son entidades competitivas). Asignando los ítems a las entidades
que más los valoran, maximizan el bienestar social. Su desventaja es, sin embargo, que
son más lentas en su desarrollo y suelen requerir una entidad que centralice el desarrollo,
lo que las hace poco apropiadas para el mercado de tiempo real. Los sub-ojetivos que se
tratan en los trabajos con subastas son los mismos que en el resto, añadiéndose un especial
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interés por estar a prueba de trampas como [50] o cómo integrar a los vendedores de una
forma más activa en el proceso, especialmente cuando hay más de uno [52].
No siempre se usa Teoría de Juegos, también hay un buen número de trabajos que se
apoyan en la optimización para todo el modelo [24, 22]: encontrar los valores de algunos
parámetros tales que unas funciones seleccionadas sean maximizadas o minimizadas, su-
jetas a una serie de restricciones. En el contexto del comercio de espectro, esos parámetros
son usualmente el precio por unidad de espectro (ancho de banda, potencia, ...), las restric-
ciones están relacionadas a la degradación en la calidad de los usuarios primarios y las
funciones a optimizar, que es el beneficio de los operadores primarios, pueden ser muy
diversas y seleccionarlas no es una tarea trivial. Dependiendo de la forma de la función a
optimizar y las restricciones, diferentes técnicas pueden usarse, siendo que la mayoría de
los esfuerzos están orientados a formularlas como un problema de optimización convexo
(las funciones y las restricciones son todas funciones convexas en sentido matemático),
más sencillos de resolver.
Pasando a desglosar algunos de estos trabajos, D.Niyato y E.Hossain en [23] apli-
can un conocido juego no cooperativo al comportamiento de los secundarios, juego de
Cournot, en el que éstos escogen la cantidad de espectro que quieren dado el precio que
anuncia el primario, teniendo en cuenta que les cargará un precio proporcional a la de-
manda total de todos los secundarios. La contribución más importante de este trabajo
es una formulación de juego dinámico que permite que los secundarios sólo necesiten
conocer la variación de su utilidad al tomar sus decisiones para acabar convergiendo al
equilibrio.
H.Mutlu et al. [24] se centran en maximizar el beneficio de un propietario de espectro
derivado del pago de los usuarios secundarios por acceder a su centro de llamadas, con-
siderando que el precio variará en función de la ocupación del sistema. Esa variación en
el precio que se carga influenciará la tasa de llegada de los secundarios. El coste que tiene
el primario se refleja sólo por medio de un castigo monetario si un usuario primario llega
al sistema y no puede acceder por estar lleno.
En el contexto de control de potencia, [22] introduce el comercio de espectro con “dis-
criminación de calidad”: los usuarios secundarios son clasificados en multiples categorías
de acuerdo a su preferencia por una determinada “calidad” de espectro, donde “calidad”
se refiere a máxima potencia permitida en esa banda. Los esfuerzos de computación se
centran en la estación base del primario, que deriva el set optimo de calidades que ofrecer
y precios asociados, así como la asociación de cada uno de estos pares a un tipo consumi-
dor de usuario secundario, de manera que se maximiza el beneficio del operador primario
a la vez que estas asociaciones (llamadas “contratos”) tienen incentivo para los usuarios
sencundarios, siendo así que cada usuario secundario de cada tipo decidirá precisamente
que la mejor calidad-precio es la que el primario le asoció, incluso considerando la op-
ción de no transmitir. Esta solución es peor que el óptimo social que podría conseguirse
idealmente, a cambio de incrementar el incentivo en los primarios dramáticamente.
En escenario similar, [20] apunta a mejorar el bienestar social de la compartición de
recursos considerando que cada canal CDMA es un canal multiusuario, esto es, múltiples
usuarios secundarios comparten canal y han de considerar interferencias mutuas. Usa
un juego no cooperativo sobre potencia en los usuarios secundarios, los cuales también
realizan una optimización del precio a pagar de manera descentralizada, donde la función
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de precio es obtenida por cada uno de ellos y es distinto en cada uno, requiriendo sólo
información local. También desarrolla un protocolo MAC para el intercambio de mensajes
necesario.
El trabajo de O.Simeone et al. [26] introducen un campo interesante en el comercio
de espectro y es pasar del intercambio espectro-por-dinero a espectro-por-cooperación.
La premisa es tan simple como el comercio habitual: un usuario primario vende oportu-
nidades de transmisión a los usuarios secundarios si, a cambio éstos primero le ayudan en
su transmisión haciendo de “relays”, lo que permite que el usuario primario incremente
su tasa de .transmisión. J.Zhang y Q.Zhang [27] añade al trabajo previo la idea de que el
usuario primario tiene cierta demanda de tráfico y una vez satisfecha, no tiene incentivo
en continuar mejorando su tasa de transmisión y por tanto, dejaría de permitir el acceso
a usuarios secundarios. Para evitarlo, los autores proponen que los usuarios secundarios
deberían además pagar cierto valor monetario al primario.
Competición de vendedores
La competición entre vendedores se introduce en muchos de estos trabajos como un mod-
elo de mercado en tres capas como 4.1 en el que en la primera capa los operadores primar-
ios obtienen licencias de entidades reguladoras para largos plazos y dan servicio a usuarios
primarios por medio de suscripciones; en la segunda capa éstos operadores venden por-
ciones de ese espectro que poseen a operadores secundarios en una escala de tiempos
menor; y en la tercera capa los operadores secundarios venden ese espectro a usuarios
secundarios a escalas de tiempo muy pequeñas, casi tiempo real.
Como en trabajos citados previamente, el ajuste del precio sigue siendo el problema
más exhaustivamente estudiado, pero añadiéndole nuevas dimensiones traídas por la com-
petición de los vendedores y enfocarse en los operadores secundarios como capa interme-
dia: heterogeneidad del espectro [34, 36], estudio conjunto de inversión en espectro y
precio de venta [36, 41, 42]. También hay trabajos fuera de este modelo de tres capas
como [34, 37], incluso con una relación diferente entre operadores primario y secundar-
ios [43]
Y.Xing et al. [34] proponen un modelo con operadores y usuarios interactuando direc-
tamente (sin categorías), donde los usuarios perciben el espectro como un bien heterogé-
neo del que hacen diferentes valoraciones dependiendo de su aplicación y distancia a los
operadores. Los usuarios también tienen diferentes sensibilidades hacia bien la “calidad”
(entendida como cualquier valoración que el usuario quiera hacer) o precio, así como un
presupuesto limitado y mínimos requerimientos de QoS. Uno de sus resultados más in-
teresantes es que el coste del espectro tiene gran impacto en el beneficio, de manera que
los vendedores de perfil bajo (menor calidad) pueden acabar ganando más. Este trabajo
es uno de los más completos del área pero no contempla dinamismo, como la variación
de oferta y demanda con el tiempo.
J. Jia y Q.Zhang. en [36] realizó el primer estudio conjunto de la inversión en la com-
pra de espectro y precio posterior a usuarios, fijando el marco de trabajo de partida para
estos estudios, con un juego no cooperativo también en tres etapas: inversión en compra
de espectro, fijación del precio de venta a secundarios, selección de los usuarios secundar-
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ios de su operador preferido, teniendo en cuenta heterogeneidad en el espectro. Este tipo
de juegos multi-etapa suelen resolverse mediante “backward induction” (inducción ha-
cia atrás). Los autores también proponen una solución cuando los operadores sólo puede
conocer su función de beneficio, rompiendo el juego en dos juegos dinámicos: primero
uno a corto plazo de ajuste del precio en una serie de iteraciones y luego otro más a largo
plazo, cuando el anterior esta estabilizado, de ajuste del ancho de banda a alquilar de los
primarios, con la desventaja de que para alcanzar el equilibrio del sistema se requiere
cierto tiempo.
L.Duan et al. [41] trabajan esta misma estructura con la salvedad de que los operadores
secundarios no compiten directamente en la etapa de compra de espectro (el coste del
espectro es el mismo para ambos y fijo, no depende de su demanda total como en trabajo
anterior), aunque claman ser los primeros en realizar el estudio conjunto de inversión en
espectro y ajuste de precio considerando heterogeneidad en las condiciones de transmisión
de los usuarios (diferentes condiciones de canal, potencia máxima). Utilizan distintas
funciones en el desarrollo matemático, que les permiten obtener estructuras de tipo umbral
para las decisiones de cada etapa y una SNR para los usuarios justo y predecible por ellos
mismos. Además, anuncian que el beneficio que obtienen los operadores en competición
es sólo un 20% menor que el caso monopolístico.
Posibles líneas de trabajo futuras y conclusiones
Además de la tendencia a unificar en un mismo modelo cada vez más sub-aspectos es-
tudiados, existen como problemas abiertos la sobrecarga de comunicación (no se suele
contemplar el coste que requiere el intercambio de mensajes asociado); la protección
contra conductas maliciosas como mentir en la publicación de información privada o co-
operación maliciosa entre proveedores o entre usuarios para subir/bajar precios respec-
tivamente; y la falta de racionalidad e información completa pues fallos similares a los
anteriores pueden ocurrir cuando simplemente esa información no aparece debido a fal-
las o incluso se transmite de forma errónea. Teoría de Juegos, además, asume que los
jugadores son totalmente racionales pero no ofrece protección contra fallos en sus deci-
siones que hicieran que esa afirmación no sea totalmente cierta.
En este trabajo se ha presentado una visión panorámica del comercio automático de
espectro que por su visión didáctica aspira a ser el punto de partida para aquellos que
quieran introducirse en el mismo. Puede apreciarse en esta visión como es un campo
relativamente nuevo con abundantes desarrollos teóricos pero cuyas soluciones siguen
estando más o menos lejos de las aplicaciones reales ante la complejidad de las mismas,
donde prima la utilización de la moderna Teoría de Juegos por su adaptabilidad natural a
la estructura descentralizada e independiente de las redes que surgen en torno al comercio
de espectro.
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